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ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND JURISPRUDENCE
JEROME HALL
O

NE

of the greatesthindrancesto tents only if a problem or other guid-

the progress of philosophy is
the difficulty of testing philosophical arguments in definite ways;
as the old truism has it, a philosophy is
not refuted, it merely loses its attraction. It is, therefore, a matter of general
significancethat an appraisal of the application of analytic philosophy to jurisprudence can be made in relatively
precise, objective ways, since there is
available, as a testing ground, an advanced legal system with its profusion
of concepts and well-known methods of
elucidation.
Among the diverse contributions to
analytic philosophy, that of the late J.
L. Austin has been recognized for its
special relevance to jurisprudence. In
describinghis method of "doing philosophy," his colleague, J. 0. Urmson,1
said that Austin worked with a group
of scholars and that first they chose an
"area of discourse" and selected terms
and idioms that seemed significant, that
is, that were interesting; this was done
by free association, reading documents
and books, not by philosophers,but, for
example, the law reports of cases and
books on psychology and, of course, the
dictionary. Members of the group then
gave examples of the correct and incorrect use of these terms and, finally, an
explanation of their use.
On the face of it, there are several
puzzles about this way of doing philosophy. In the first place, dictionariesare
omnibus collections, and it would seem
that one makes good use of their con-

ing line is held in view. But while that
makes the foray intelligible, it contradicts the alleged mode of selection.2
There are also problems regarding the
use of law reports.
For example, in "A Plea for Excuses"3
Austin sets out the report of Regina v.
Finney, a case decided in 1874, in which
the defendant, an attendant in an insane asylum, was tried for manslaughter in that, being in charge of a patient
who was taking a bath and thinking the
patient had left the tub, he turned on
the hot water instead of the cold, thus
scalding the patient "to death." Austin
makes two comments: (1) both the
lawyers and the judge used a large number of terms of excuse ("accident,"
"'negligence," "mistake") as though
they were indifferentor equivalent or alternatives, when they are not; and (2)
Justice Lush's instruction to the jury
was "a paradigm of the faults,' while
the defendant was a "master of the
Queen's English." When one has recovered from his surpriseat this preference
for the speech of a male nurse over that
of a High Court English judge and is informed that, under the law, the defendant could not have been convicted
of manslaughterunless he was reckless
in turning on the hot water, it is apparent that there was no reason, in the
determination of that issue, to distinguish "accident"from "negligence"and
"mistake."
If the purpose of "A Plea for Excuses" was not to criticize the language
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of judges from a non-legal perspective
but was, instead, to understand the use
of legal terms, other difficultiesare met.
First, many ordinary words are used in
a technical sense, and it requires a great
deal of study, in effect a legal education,
to understandhow those terms are used.
For example, burglary includes an "entry," but the image summonedby ordinary speech-a man inside a house-is
not the legal meaning of "entry." Part
of a hand inside a window, engaged in
raising it, a bullet shot into a room, and
even a hole bored in the floor of a granary, through which the grain drops into
sacks held below the floor, are entries
in the legal sense. The common-lawdefinition of murderis killing a human being with "malice aforethought"; but
"malice" does not mean malice, and
"aforethought"is not premeditation in
the dictionary sense. The philosophical
significance of lay criticism of a random selection of expressions from law
reports is not immediately apparent.
The pertinent question, however,
does not concern the use of "philosophy" but the fact that there are different levels of discourse, which have distinctive significance and functions. If
we take constitutions, statutes, and decisions (case law) as the data of positive law, we may distinguish the lawyer's elucidation of their terms and
expressions from their elucidation by
use of legal theories and legal philosophies. The analysis of a rule of criminal
law, for example, containing "burglary," consists partly in reducing it to its
so-called material elements, namely,
breaking, entry, dwelling house, nighttime, and intent to commit a felony.
Lawyers and judges work in relatively
close proximity to the legal data and
feel no great need to systematize their
knowledge of a field of law. They are
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familiarwith the "material" (essential)
parts of the definitions of crimes, the
causes of action, and the various defenses; and the case law is their authoritative dictionary.
The legal theorist knows all this, but
his interest extends beyond the average
practitioner's knowledge. For him, the
further elucidation of legal concepts depends on relevant theories, that is, organized sets of propositions which interrelate the basic concepts so that the
significance of each and, consequently,
of every part of the law referred to is
maximized. For example, a theory of
criminal law, in which I have had some
interest, is posited (a) on distinctions
drawn among principles, doctrines, and
rules; (b) on their interrelations; and
(c) on the thesis that only voluntary
conduct should be punishable.4
The rules specify what is distinctive
of each crime; they include verbs such
as "burn," "kill," "carry away"; and,
finally, they presuppose the "normal
adult" and "normalconduct." The doctrines comprise statements in terms of
(a) infancy, insanity, intoxication, mistake of fact or law, coercion, and necessity and also (b) in terms of attempt,
solicitation, conspiracy, and complicity.
It is doctrines of the first type, concerning incapacity or unusual situations, to
which Austin and others refer as "excuses"; the latter doctrines concern the
degree of harm. It is necessary to see
that the doctrines refer to common elements of all the crimes and that the
entire criminallaw is defined by the addition of all the doctrines to all the
rules. Finally, if one examines this body
of criminal law, comprisedof the union
of the rules and the doctrines, it will be
seen that there are seven principles that
underlie and permeate that legal structure; they are stated in terms of legal-
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ity, mens rea, act, the concurrence or
fusion of mens rea and act (to form
conduct), harm, causation (connecting
conduct and harm), and punishment.
Criminal-law theory not only constructs the above concepts and draws
the above distinctions, it also interrelates the propositions that include
those concepts. Something was said
above about the interrelations of rules,
doctrines,and principles; the principles
are also interrelated to each other, that
is, conduct to causing to harm, for
which punishment must be imposed,
all presupposing the framework of legality. Enough has been set out, it is
hoped (and more will be said later),
to indicate how the elucidation of terms,
expressions, and questions by use of a
legal theory is distinguished from the
directly case-guided, unorganized elucidation of statutes and cases employed
in the practice of law. It would seem to
follow rather oddly, if Austin was "doing philosophy" in "A Plea for Excuses," that some treatises on criminal
law are more philosophical, in increasing understandingof the concepts discussed there, than that essay; at least
a test of that is available by comparing
Austin's discussion of coercion, mistake,
and act with that in English or American texts on criminal law.
If "doing philosophy" is only an exercise in logic, it makes no difference
whether the propositions one discusses
include "burglary" or "mistake" or
"right" or "law." But if there are important differences among these levels
of elucidation, and if the construction
of patterns opens deeper layers of understanding, one should draw relevant
inferences about "philosophy."Accordingly, if we ascend from the level of a
legal theory (i.e., from that of the legal
theories of the various particular fields

of law) to a still higher level, we enter
the realm of legal philosophy. Here
the central concept is that of "law"
(as contrasted with that of criminal or
contract or property law); and relevant
subordinate concepts are designated by
such terms as "right,""duty," "power,"
"privilege," and various other "fundamental legal concepts." In sum, the
lawyer's elucidation, legal theory, and
legal philosophy represent progressively higher levels of generalization; and
it is equally important to keep in mind
that each of these types of discourse is
an elucidation of rules of positive law,
that is, propositions that have both
normative and descriptive significance.
The elucidation of legal expressions
by use of the above descriptive-normative theory may be contrasted with another exercise in analytic philosophy,
which will bring some of the above
matters into sharper focus. In a recent
symposium on responsibility, Professor
Edgar Bodenheimer, a legal scholar,
opposed the current thesis that punishment is obsolete. In his discussion of punishment, he spoke of "requital for a wrong" and of a "blameworthy act" deserving "disagreeable
consequences." He recognized that
"punishment" has various meanings,
and he was careful to say that the term
"will be used" by him in its moral
sense; he noted that "this restricted
meaning" conforms "with the popular
notion of the term."
His discussion was followed by that
of Professor Joel Feinberg, who took
exception to Bodenheimer's analysis
"in one important respect," namely, he
objected to the ethical connotation of
Bodenheimer's definition of "punishment." He gave three examples of what,
he said, "all of us would agree in identifying . . . as instances of legal punish-
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ment"0-a traffic violation, the conviction of a South African Caucasian
for entertaining Negroes in his home
in violation of law, and a conviction of
murder. "All of them" he said, "are
perfectly clear examples of legal punishment .

..

[they] are clear and non-

controversial models of legal punishment."7 Like Bodenheimer, Feinberg
recognized that "punishment" is ambiguous, but unmoved by the fact that
a legal scholar preferred its moral connotation, Feinberg rejected that: It has
the disadvantages that "on this definition many of the cases generally called
punishment are not really instances of
punishment at all, and this is true even
of some of the standard examples of
legal punishment."8 For example, despite the fact that the South African
Caucasian who entertained Negroes in
his home may have acted from "the
highest moral purposes," "there is no
question that he was punished for his
act, and that his punishment was legal
punishment."9So, too, "of a man who
violates . . . a business regulation of

whose existence he was wholly unHe added that "the greatest
aware.")10
drawback of a definition of 'legal punishment' in moral terms is that it tends
to obscure the discussion of the justification of punishment and it invites
equivocation"; but since he gave no
reasons to support these assertions,
they may be passed over.
An immediate difficulty is that, on
the face of the discussion, there are
two linguistic facts, two "paradigm"or
"standard" uses or cases, that seem
directly opposed, namely, the popular
use of "punishment" and the frequent
use of "punishment"to cover the various cases put by Feinberg. Something
more is therefore needed than the assertion of a linguistic preference. The
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statement that "we" and "all of us
would agree in identifying as instances
of punishment . . ." obviously excludes

Bodenheimer and all others who hold
that in its most important function
"punishment"has a moral connotation
and that clarity is also advanced if
"punishment" is given that restricted
meaning. "We" and "all of us" would
exclude Socrates (who distinguishedthe
Tyrants' "mere command" from law);
those who espouse a natural-lawphilosophy; presumably Negroes of South
Africa who do not recognize the discriminatory regulations as law; and,
also, legal scholars who distinguish
criminal law from quasi-offenses or
mere violations. One may infer either
that ordinary language is internally inconsistent or, more probably, that different purposes and contexts are implied in different uses.
Even if all scholars could be persuaded to use "punishment" in one
sense (a futile quest), this uniformity
would hardly touch the difficult problems of punishment that scholars try
to solve. If one seeks more thorough
elucidation of "punishment"than that
provided by reference to an alleged
"standard" use,'2 that can be had by
consulting legal theories and the discussions of philosophers.If this is done,
one discovers many important facts,
for example, that the moral connotation
of "punishment,"beginning with Aristotle's Ethics, where "punishment" is
restricted to voluntary harmdoing, has
been elucidated in many thoughtful discussions. He would also discover, as
was noted above, that criminal-law
theory interrelates punishment with
other significant concepts; instead of
asking how "punishment"is ordinarily
used (which gives a variety of apparently contradictory answers), one elu-
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cidates "punishment"by relating it to
voluntary conduct, social harm, and
causation and, also, by bringing that
set of interrelationsinto the larger pattern of the interrelations of the principles, doctrines, and rules.
We must now consider the question,
noted above, regarding the variety of
"laws" in modern legal systems, for
example, murder, the South African
case, trafficand technical business regulations, and inadvertent negligent behavior. This question was discussed
in an essay by H. L. A. Hart,'3 where
he criticized the writer's theory of criminal law on grounds that indicate that
much more than analysis is involved
in analytic philosophy.
In this essay, Hart criticizes the thesis that mens rea, the central term in
the basic principle of criminal liability,
is the "intentional or reckless doing of
a morally wrong act," and he criticizes
especially the statement that "though
mens rea differs in different crimes
there is one common essential element,
namely, the voluntary doing of a morally wrong act forbidden by the law."'4
Hart states that, if the above theory
of criminal law "were merely a theory
as to what the criminal law of a good
society should be, it would not be possible to refute it.... But of course Professor Hall's doctrine does not fit any
actual system of criminal law because
in every such system there are necessarily many actions . . . that if volun-

tarily done are criminally punishable,
although our moral code may be either
silent as to their moral quality, or divided."'5

The relevant facts are simple enough
and require no legal competence to be
understood. Our legal system includes
strict liability, where punitive sanctions are imposed regardless even of

thte degree of care taken, for example,
if misbranded food or drugs are innocently shipped from a factory; there
are penalties for inadvertent negligent
behavior, and every legal system reflects an inevitable accretion of archaic laws. But the further fact is that
almost the whole corpus of the common
law of crimes and a vast array of serious statutory crimes all require mens
rea as a basic condition of liability.
In view of the practical consequences
and for everyday purposes, one definition of "criminal law" is understandably focused only on the punitive sanction, and another definition is even
more formal than that, specifying only
the criterion that the relevant legal proceedings are instituted and controlled
by the state. When Stephen wrote
his treatise a century ago, he was impressed by the diversity of laws to
which punitive sanctions were applied
as well as by even that of the many
crimes in which mens rea was required.
He therefore maintained that there was
no mens rea; there are only mentes
reae, that is, a multiplicity of the
"states of mind" indicated by the variety of rules and statutes. This led to
the formality that mens rea is whatever
state of mind or absence of any state
of mind (inadvertent negligence) is expressed in any proscription by the sovereign of any conduct or any behavior,
so long as that was sanctioned by "punishment." There were other deficiencies
in the current views of criminal law,
for example, the lack of appreciation
of the significanceof "harm"and "causation" and, above all, the lack of any
system or definite organization of the
fundamental concepts.
For the indicated reasons, a theory
of criminal law was constructed which,
while it does "not fit" the whole of "any
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actual system of criminal law" (if
criminal law" is employed in the relatively formal sense noted above), does
fit the most important part of that law
((thus formally defined)-"importance"
referring to the predominant signifi(canceof the common law of crimes and
:a vast body of statutory law marked
Ibythe gravity of the harm and the severity of the punishment. By adhering
to a descriptive-normativemeaning of
rea, it thus became possible to
A"mens
(construct a theory that encompassed
what everyone recognizes as criminal
law (as contrasted with "quasi-offenses" and "public torts" that scholars
apply to strict liability violations),
which is indeed the basic criminal law
of all advanced legal systems. That is
the theory previously described in
terms of certain principles, doctrines,
and rules.
Far from being merely of academic
significance, the theory not only conforms to the judges' preferences expressed in centuries of decision"' but
also maximizes the resourcefulness of
lawyers in dealing with offenses that do
not fall within the orbit of the theory;
and the judges' interpretation of statutes also shows innumerable efforts to
narrow or circumvent statutes whose
literal terms oppose the principle of
mens rea. Some of the most important
recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, for example, their recognition,
as defenses, of ignorance of a city ordinance'7and ignoranceby a bookseller
of the obscene contents of certain
books,'8 were based on the statutes'
contradictionof the mens rea principle.
So, too, the fact that offences subjected
to strict liability (foreign legal systems
require at least negligence as the condition of liability) have been called
"public torts," etc., by many scholars
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also reveals the significance and influence of a descriptive view of criminal
law.'9 In sum, by distinguishingamong
the proscriptions - ordinarily called
"criminal laws," it became possible to
construct a theory that not only fits a
very large and most important part of
them but also lays the groundworkfor
an organized knowledge of them; and
the theory also supplies a firmly established vantage point from which to criticize and improve "laws" that do not
conform to the specified standards and
criteria. It may be added that the fact
that a theory covers only certain data,
but not others, is characteristic of all
theories; hence, the way to refute a
theory is to construct a different theory
which, with at least equal significance,
covers those data as well as other data.
The above descriptive-normativetheory of criminal law is posited not only
on mens rea but also on the further effort ("act") characteristicof the voluntary conduct that produced the harm;
on causation, in the sense of authorship;
on harm viewed as a social disvalue;
and on punishment,interpretedin its relation to those descriptive-normative
concepts. When these notions are
brought into significant interrelations,
each of them gains in significance; the
same kind of advance in understanding
and elucidation that is represented by
theories of physical science, as opposed
to the early ad hoc trial and error aided
by a conglomeration of unorganized
doctrines, is also reflected in a theory of a branch of law.
"In the abstract," the analytic philosophy of excuses might take account
of such theories. But this would require
a neutral analysis that is not characteristic of that philosophy, whose metaphysical preferences resemble those of
Ryle's Concept of Mind (1949).20 He
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said there that in "ordinary employment" "we discuss whether someone's
action was voluntary or not only when
the action seems to have been his fault.

"The Ascription of Responsibility and
Rights,"24where he states, "There are
in our ordinary language sentences
whose primary function is not to de-

scribe things . . . or anything else, nor
to
express or kindle . . . emotions, but
we raise questions of responsibility
only when someone is charged, justly to . . . claim rights . . . recognize rights
or unjustly, with an offense." "But phi- . . . ascribe rights . .. transfer rights . . .
. . . In the same way in ordinary life

losophers,"he added, "tend to describe
as voluntary not only reprehensiblebut
also meritoriousactions, not only things
that are someone's fault but also things
that are to his credit."' He later added
that sometimes "we oppose things done
voluntarily to things suffered under
compulsion." But this, he said, is only
to decide whether a person did something or whether it was done to him.22
Again, one finds a preference for a particular usage and neglect of the fact
that ordinary speech includes the use
of "voluntary" and "responsibility" in
a meritorious sense, for example, "his
fasting, when rations were short, was
voluntary"; "the suspect voluntarily
came to the police station"; the citation
read, "Private X voluntarily took up
his post at the most dangerous point";
and similar uses of "responsibility"
could be stated. "Voluntary"is closely
associated with "freedom"; and "freedom" in the sense of capacity or power
to do what one wants to do is as common or "standard" as is "freedom
from coercion."23There is, also, the
difference between freedom of choice
and freedom of action. The former is
a matter of knowledge and is therefore
enlarged by education. A relevant firstperson report might be: "I knew what
I wanted. I decided to do X. I sensed
the effort I was making and my ability
to achieve my goal."
With these various linguistic uses in
view, one can more readily apprehend
the thrust of Hart's well-known essay,

and also to admit or ascribe or make
accusations of responsibility." His
"main purpose" is to show that such
statements as "he did it" are not descriptive but ascriptive; their function
is "to ascribe responsibility for actions."
Although Hart speaks of the "primary"
function of such expressions, his purpose is plain-he wishes to prove that
certain concepts are not descriptive.25
At the outset, there are difficulties in
the way of speaking of the ascription
of responsibility for an action. The
statement "he did it" (which Hart employs) serves to identify a person;
moreover, we speak of being responsible for an effect, for example, a harm,
not for one's acting. But, since these
questions have been discussed by others,26it is necessary here to add only
that the ascription of responsibility for
a criminal harm presupposes the competence or normality of the actor and
the fact that he produced (caused) that
harm. The ascription of responsibility,
in the sense of imputing or imposing
liability, is only the last stage of an
inquiry which must have been preceded
by the factual determinations of competency and causation. It is possible,
of course, to draw a hard line between
these facts and the imposition of liability ("ascription of responsibility"), but
this only ignores the close relationship
between the facts and the judgment.
The judgment is obviously not a description of the above facts in the ordinary sense of "description," say, in
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terms of a color. But the facts of competency and causation and the judgment are so closely connected that the
latter "fits" or is "apt" or "correct"
only by reference to the former. It
hardly suffices merely to assert that
the ascription of responsibility is not
descriptive.
That legal expressions which include
such terms as "contract," "murder,"
and "responsible"are partly ascriptive
is common opinion; nor would Austin's
discovery that such statements as "I
promise" and "I agree" are "performatory" be news to any law student or to
anyone who has made an agreement.
Hart's thesis, however, extends far beyond the boundary of disputes regarding ethical judgments and the imputation of liability. As noted, he argues
that statements regarding action, such
as "he did it," are ascriptive, not descriptive, and he carries this to the
point of maintaining that "intention,"
"mens rea," and "voluntary" are also
only ascriptive. There is, of course, no
necessary connection between the two
positions, and a philosopher might well
hold that "intention" is descriptive of
a mental state and also that a moral
judgment is not descriptive.
The present issue, then, is narrowed
to the question whether the legal terms
Hart discusses, especially "mens rea"
(criminal intention) and "voluntary,"
are descriptive or explanatory or anything else, as well as ascriptive. Hart
does not consider that there may be
crucial differences between contract
and criminal law, and he applies his
thesis of ascription equally to both.
But it is well known that in some theories of contract law and, perhaps, in
the prevailing view, "meeting of the
minds" is given a wholly external meaning, which, as will appear more fully,

21

is not normally the case in criminal law
as regards"intention"and "voluntary."
Hart states that legal concepts such
as contract, murder, voluntary, intention, and act are "defeasible," and he
speaks of "this characteristic of legal
concepts."27But what he refers to is
that certain excuses "can defeat a claim
that there is a valid contract."28This
confusion between defeating a claim
and the concept of the claim itself runs
through his discussion, with unfortunate consequences,as does his later confusion of a prosecutor'scharge with the
concept of the crime charged; but either a crime was committed, that is, all
the essential elements were present, or
the contrary is true.29
Discussing "contract," Hart notes
that a plaintiff's claim can be opposed
by a denial of the facts or, more important for his purpose, by a plea of
exception or excuse, for example, misrepresentation,undue influence,lunacy,
etc. (and, he might have added, by admission of the facts but submission that
they do not comprisea cause of action).
He grants that philosophers (he might
have added legal scholars)30have supplied relevant formulas and that Pollock, an authority on contract law, said,
"The consent must be true, full and
free."'3' "But," states Hart, "such a
general formula may be profoundly
misleading [for whom, is not specified],
for the positive looking doctrine, 'consent must be true, full and free' is only
accurate as a statement of the law if
treated as a compendious reference to
the defenses"; it "is therefore, in fact,
to say that defenses such as undue
influence and coercion, and any others
which should be grouped with them,
are admitted."32 And, for Hart, the
practice of law "makes this clear,"
since he believes the plaintiff must not
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prove that there was "true, full and
free" consent.
But this confuses legal procedure
with the significance of that procedure
when it is combined with the assumption of normal capacity and normal
action, upon which it rests. For example, everywhere in criminal law it
is also assumed that the defendant was
sane, and it would be absurd to require
the prosecution to prove in every case
that the defendant was sane. When a
plea of insanity is raised, in most of
the states, the prosecution must prove
that the defendant was sane when he
acted, while elsewhere, including England, the defense must prove insanity;
if it fails, the verdict "guilty" implies
that the requisite mens rea was present.
Similarly, one who sues for breach of
contract must prove certain actions and
conditions (offer, acceptance, and consideration) that are assumed to be normal until that is controverted by the
defense. If the jury finds for the plaintiff, its verdict rests on the preponderance of his evidence that the conditions
were normal; the finding of normal
consent is necessarily an inference,
drawn from the external facts interpreted in the light of the jurors' experience.
Applying his thesis to the criminal
law, Hart states that "attempts to define in general terms 'the mental conditions' of liability . . . are only not misleading if their positive and general
terms are treated merely as a restatement or summary of the fact that various heterogeneous defenses or exceptions are admitted."33Then he states
a very different thesis: "What is meant
by the mental element in criminal liability meanssrea)," he now says, "is
only to be understood by considering
certain defenses or exceptions, such as

Mistake of Fact, Accident, Coercion,
Duress, Provocation, Insanity, Infancy."134

For, plainly, to state that one

must consider the excuses in order to
understandmens rea (which, of course,
is granted) is far from stating that
mens rea is only "a restatement or summary of . . . various heterogeneous de-

fenses." Hart then states that, "in pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp of a general
formula, legal theorists have sought to
impose a spurious unity . . . upon
these heterogeneous defenses . . . sug-

gesting that they are admitted as merely evidence of the absence of some
single element ('intention').

. .

. And

this is misleading because what the
theorist misrepresents as evidence negativing the presence of necessary mental elements are, in fact, multiple criteria or grounds defeating the allegation of responsibility."35But this does
not consider the possibility (the current
"standard" usage) that the reason for
excusing a person ("defeating the allegation of responsibility") is that he
lacks a requiredmens rea (i.e., the two
go together); hence it is arbitrary to
formulate the issue in terms of either
necessary mental element or defeat of
responsibility. Hart does not discuss
any functional difference between
"evidence negating . .

."

and "grounds

defeating . . ."; instead, after a dubious
use of Aristotle,36 he acknowledges:
"It is, of course, possible to represent
the admission of these different defences or exceptions as showing that
there is a single mental element ('voluntariness') . . . required as necessary

mental conditions meanssrea) of full
criminal liability."37 But he reaffirms
his thesis that "mens rea" is not descriptive, that it only excludes excuses.
Of course, mens rea excludes the excuses. But this does not prove that
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mens rea has no descriptive or positive
normative function. That it has such
functions in the theory of criminal law
discussed above is evident from the
fact that the principles, including that
of mens rea, are derived, not from the
doctrines (excuses) alone, but from
the doctrinesadded to the rules (which,
it will be recalled, are stated in terms
of the intentional or reckless commission of certain harms). Thus mens rea
does not mean only that the excuses
were excluded; its meaning is also that
the defendant intentionally or recklessly did what the rules proscribe. A
criminal act is the fusion of a mens rea
with the effort required to effect the
harm, for example, "A intentionally
shot B." To say that A was not insane,
did not think B was a deer, and was
not threatenedby anyone does not wipe
the slate clean; it leaves A's action,
proscribed by the rule. Thus, the excuses resemble negative concepts which
necessarily presuppose positive onesmistake presupposes correct perception, insanity, sanity, and so on. The
exclusion of the excuses presupposes
the normality of the defendant and his
conduct; "mens rea" is descriptive of
his mental state, and that principle
also expresses disapproval of his conduct.
The rules are more important than
the doctrines in that they imply the
normal condition; and it is therefore
possible to conceive of a (primitive)
legal system that consisted only of
rules but not of one that consisted only
of doctrines (excuses). For an enumeration of all the excuses would still leave
it necessary to state, whenever no excuse was accepted, that a person is liable because he voluntarily committed
a proscribed harm. Nor will it do to
say that the exclusion of excuses im-
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plies only that the defendant is liable,
since there is no such thing as "liability
in the air"; in daily life, as in law, it is
necessary to answer the questionliable for what? The rules, not the
doctrines or their exclusion, answer
that question.
In everyday experience and in many
psychologies and philosophies, "action"
implies thinking, planning, the anticipation of an end to be achieved, the visualization of a change in a state of affairs, and, of course, the effort required
to effect a plan. Law builds on that
ordinary experience, and most cases
turn on denials of the asserted facts
(the rules). Nothing is said about mistake, insanity, coercion, etc.; if the
premise of normal conduct is not challenged, the mens rea is found as a matter of course, as implied in the verdict
of guilt. In a minority of the cases an
excuse is pleaded, and the prosecution
must not only refute the plea, it must
also prove that the defendant did certain things. Suppose the defendant
simply denies having done what is
charged, for example, pleads an alibi
or mistaken identity. Discussion of the
excuses would be irrelevant, and their
exclusion could not possibly lead anyone to conclude that he had committed
the crime. And if those pleas (alibis,
etc.) were rejected, the mens rea would
characterize that defendant's action
just as it does if a plea of insanity or
mistake is rejected.38
Instead of arguing that "mens rea"
functions only to exclude excuses, it
would be correct and persuasive to argue that the acceptance of an excuse
functions to exclude mens rea. But this
does not imply that the excuses are
mere formulas or functions. On the
contrary, it is because an excuse is descriptive of a mental state and relevant
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abnormal conduct that it functions to
exculpate. Thus, if the purpose of the
analytic philosophers' treatment of excuses was to exorcise mental states,
they have employed concepts that are
inconsistent with that purpose. So, finally, pleas of excuse are just as "defeasible" as the claim that a contract
was made or the charge that a certain
crime was committed; the jury may
not believe the defense.
The influence of Ryle on the linguistic analysis of excuses is obviousto substitute "pleas of excuse" for "expressions of theories" is simple enough.
While Ryle's emphasis on the expression of theories rather than on their
discovery or construction gave some
plausibility to his identification of
thinking and talking, that is hardly
available as regards legal excuses. For
a discussion of those excuses cannot
avoid the rules of law and their reference to mental states, since excuses
cannot be understoodunless one understands what is to be excused.
Long before Ryle's verbal behaviorism,39Watsonian behaviorism and that
of his successors in psychology had
stimulated legal realists and others to
discover ways of dispensing with mental states. They flounderedon the rocks
of criminal law and other branches of
law which are intelligible only if mental states are considered. The external
behavior of an intentional killer, a negligent one, and a mistaken one might
be identical. The significant differences
are ascertainable only by discovery of
the respectively differentstates of mind,
for example, whether putting a spoonful of sugar into another person's cup
of tea was an innocent act or an attempt
to kill. Of course, an inference regarding another's state of mind must be
based on observable actions or on talk,

including confession; but the actor can
immediately disclose his state of mind.
It is also true that one makes many decisions that are never carried out; only
he has knowledge of those mental
states.40 Thus dependence on external
action in fact-finding and the existence
of internal states are very differentmatters.
A way of doing philosophy is judged
by its product; hence the conclusions
reached above are bound to influence
one's estimate of the methods employed
in the application of analytic philosophy to jurisprudence.Yet methods are
sometimes valued in themselves, apart
from any aesthetic quality or interest.
Hart discussed his way of doing jurisprudence in an essay intended to elucidate the use of "right" and "corporation." In his view, the use of these
terms "is not understood because compared with most ordinary words these
legal words are . . . anomalous," by

which he means that words like "corporation" and "right" "do not have the
straightforward connection with counterparts in the world of fact" that most
ordinarywords have.
In trying to understandHart's method, one must first contrast it with the
theories he dismisses: (1) that a word
stands for an unexpected or complex or
psychological fact, for example, the
American legal realists' theory that a
right is a term used in predicting the
behaviorof judges; (2) that a right is a
fiction, standing for no fact (the Scandinavian realists' theory); (3) that a
right stands for something (a corporation-)different from other things just in
that we cannot touch it, hear it, see it,
feel it (a "now unfashionable" theory)41; and (4) the (nominalist) license
to define words as one pleases since this
"trivializes" the questions asked about
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"law"and "right."
He then describeshis method of "elucidation" by explaining how a game of
cards is played-its rule regarding the
highest card, that a particular player
"scores a point," and so on-and he
concludes, "in these circumstances that
player is said to have 'taken a trick.'"
This, he says, is not providing a synonym; it elucidates the use of the above
expression by specifying the conditions
under which the whole sentence is true
and by showing how it is used in drawing a conclusion from the rules in a particular case. And he concludes:
I would therefore tender the following as an
elucidation of the expression "a legal right":
(1) a statement of the form "X has a right"
is true if the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) There is in existence a legal system.
(b) Under a rule or rules of the system some
other person Y is, in the events which have
happened, obliged to do or abstain from some
action.
(c) This obligation is made by law dependent on the choice of X or some person authorized to act on his behalf so that either Y is
bound to do or abstain from some action only
if X (or some authorized person) so chooses
or alternatively only until X (or such person)
chooses otherwise. (2) A statement of the form
"X has a right" is used to draw a conclusion
of law in a particular case which falls under
such rules.42

In the first place, one must ask, are
legal terms anomalous in the above
sense? Do they differ, in the way Hart
states, from ordinary terms? Hart's ordinary term is "table," hence it is immediately apparent that he is comparing a very narrowconcept of perception
with a high-level jurisprudential conception. (What would result from a
comparisonof "legal right" with "matter" or "beauty"?) It is also implied
that ordinary terms and legal terms are
sharply separable, but "table" may be
a legal term, for example, if a park reg-
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ulation forbids sitting on tables and
there are flat pieces of furniture that
are higher than benches but lower than
the tables used at meals by people on
picnics. Hart also oversimplifies the
problem of elucidating words that have
"counterpartsin the world of fact." He
assumes that the ordinary definition of
"table" suffices to understand its use
but that, as regards legal concepts, "we
are puzzled when we try to understand
our own conceptual apparatus."43But
epistemological controversies regarding
perceptionraise many puzzles, and considerable sophistication is required to
understandsuch statements as "there is
a table."44To assume that we immediately understand such statements but
that a lengthy analysis is required to
understand "X has a right" is to prejudge both problems and to cloud understandingthe one by arbitrarily contrasting it with understandingthe other.
Nor is the specification of conditions,
necessary to the "truth" of an expression, peculiar to the elucidation of
statements that include legal terms.
Every expression, to be intelligible, requires its inclusion in a context; and to
elucidate propositions about tables to
persons of a very different culture, one
should specify that people do not spread
cloths on the floor or place food on it
or squat on benches, etc. Thus, if
"truth" has a logical connotation, what
Hart says about the "truth"of legal expressions applies to all expressions that
are implicationsof certain propositions;
for example, one could formulate a major and a minor premise that implied
"this is a table."
The terms "true," "existence,""legal
system," "rule," "obliged," and "obligation," are among the most "anomalous" terms in the language. Thus, Hart
began with one anomalous term, "legal

This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Thu, 5 Feb 2015 15:09:30 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

26

ETHICS

right," and his elucidation of it ended
with six anomalous terms. It will also
be noticed that his demonstrationhangs
on an "if"-if there is a legal system, if,
under a rule and so on, then it is "true"
to say "X has a right." The logic may
be impeccable, but it supplies neither
evidence nor reasons that support the
conditions; the "truth" of the conclusion "X has a right" is necessarily and
equally hypothetical.45
Every analytical jurist from John
Austin to Kelsen has discussed legal
rules and legal rights in relation to a
legal system. Kelsen has long included
the choice of the plaintiff, in instituting
legal action, in his notion of the "delict"
that requiresthe impositionof the sanction, and thus explains the plaintiff's

right. Hohfeld, building on Terry and
other notable predecessors,drew important distinctions among the various uses
of "right." If Hart has added anything
to our understandingof the use of "X
has a legal right," the increment has
not been recognized by some very able
legal scholars.46Apparently, it does not
advance jurisprudenceto regard theory
as an "incubus."47On the contrary,
some definite evidence was given above,
it is hoped, to reveal the significance of
the "strong and persistent desire to see
how the various aspects of experience
hang together[which] is perhaps the one
characteristic common and peculiar to
philosophers."IT
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